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Much has been written in recent years on the economic 
constraints of African development. Lesser attention, however, 
has been paid to the issues surrounding the development of 
financial institutions in the continent, especially institutions 
serving rural areas. This paper will focus on that and, more-
over, do so by making passing reference to rural finance in a 
Francophone country in the Sahelian region of West Africa. The 
first section reviews the poor record of top-down formal agricul-
tural credit systems in Niger. The second part reports on a 
field study in Niger documenting the revealed demand for finan-
cial services at the village level and how the top-down develop-
ment bank syndrome fails to meet that demand. The implications 
of these findings for the development of rural financial institu-
tions in Africa are drawn out in the conclusions. 
I. The Myths of Financial Development: 
Conduit or Intermediary? 
The public sector agricultural development banks in West 
Africa have experienced a deteriorating performance in recent 
years. This is particularly evident for the Caisse Nationale de 
Credit Agricole (CNCA) in Niger. It is important to review some 
of the major factors behind this poor performance. The lessons 
learned can be valuable. 
The first major cause for the decline in the financial 
viability of these institutions grows out of their lack of 
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autonomy. This manifests itself in various ways. They frequent-
ly don't mobilize domestic deposits for on-lending, or if they 
do, they represent only a minor part of their total source of 
funds. In the case of Niger, the CNCA does not engage in any 
deposit mobilization activity. This means that all funding comes 
from external donor sources, the government or rediscount lines 
from the BCEAO (the West African Central for Francophone coun-
tries.) Donors and the government central bank offer these funds 
at low rates of interest thereby discouraging domestic deposit 
mobilization. 
The net effect of this structure of liabilities is that the 
suppliers of funds call the shots. Donors and/or government 
target the lines of credit to selected agricultural clientele. 
The emphasis is on modernizing agriculture, i.e. promoting the 
adoption of new inputs as a part of technology packages. This is 
all done without any serious consideration given to costs and 
risks. The screening, documentation and reporting requirements 
add to the lending costs of the institution while the concentra-
tion of the portfolio into the riskiest activities in agriculture 
(imperfectly tested new inputs) places the institution at risk. 
All the procedures are designed to facilitate the borrower's 
interests. Put differently, the funds are expected to be 
disbursed quickly. Little attention is devoted to careful loan 
evaluation or creditworthiness. The screening expenses incurred 
by the lending institutions have nothing to do with loan evalua-
tion, but merely determining that previously defined target 
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groups in fact have received the inputs in question. Finally, 
loan recovery procedures are weak to non-existent and loan 
recovery practices more so. Thus, financial viability is 
minimized, especially if it comes into conflict with targeting 
and the quick disbursement of inputs to promote productivity and 
output goals. In short, one has a "borrower dominated" institu-
tion, the classic institutional form of supply-lending finance, 
popularized in the 1960s and 1970s as the path to modernizing 
agriculture. The lending institution becomes nothing more than 
an administrative conduit, not a true intermediary. 
A second major cause for the weakness of these institutions 
lies in their lack of acceptance at the village level. Despite 
the organizational and structural deficiencies noted above, their 
performance could have improved if there had been more voluntary 
repayment behavior on the part of their loan beneficiaries in the 
villages. An interesting question emerges -- why do loan 
recipients ignore their debt obligations? They essentially do 
this because they feel the institution is alien to their setting, 
does not meet the demand for financial services they really want 
and is too unstable and undependable as a source of future loans. 
Farm level borrowers are indifferent towards repaying loans 
when the quality of that loan is poor (i.e., it arrives late, or 
forces the borrower to incur out of pocket costs and sacrifice 
foregone income, to spend time and travel to negotiate the loans, 
etc.). 
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Another instance of poor repayment is when the lending 
source is so casual and unprepared in its loan recovery pro-
cedures that it is in effect sending a message to borrowers that 
they can place a low priority on repayment. This is certainly 
relevant in the Niger setting where loan recovery procedures in 
the CNCA have been notoriously minimized, thereby implying that 
the village level borrowers can safely ignore this obligation. 
Another factor behind poor repayment is the institutional 
instability of funding that leads borrowers to conclude the 
institution will be unable to make new loans in the future. This 
discourages loan repayments since the reward of repayment cannot 
be met by a new loan. 
Thus the circle is drawn. An institution with little or no 
autonomy, no local deposit base from the general public, and 
completely dependent on external funding sources is forced into 
accepting a targeted clientele with a high risk profile and no 
assurance of continued infusion of funds to elicit good repayment 
from its borrowers. This is not a promising set of operating 
characteristics for an institution that hopes to attain self-
sustaining financial viability. 
The last point to be made in this argument is the lack of 
presence typical of a formal borrower in an African village 
setting. Loans are typically one or more years in length. There 
are no short-term rollovers so typical of informal financial 
channels and, finally, no assurance of funding during an emergen-
cy. In short, the lending institutions, in limiting themselves 
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to longer production loans necessarily restricts its capacity to 
meet the legitimate demand for continued short-term funding 
desired at the village level. This lack of frequent transactions 
for a formal lender is the very strength of informal lending 
vehicles in rural Africa. 
II. The Revealed Demand for Financial Services 
at the Village-Household Level 
A random sample of villagers was carried out during April-
May 1986 in rural Niger to determine the nature of informal 
savings and credit activity at the village level. These studies 
were conducted by an Ohio State University team of researchers 
working in conjunction with Nigerien colleagues from the Institut 
de Recherches en Sciences Humaines. 
The results generated useful insights into the demand for 
financial services at the village level through evidence on 
informal credit activity through wholesale and retail merchants, 
and savings and loan activity through informal tontines and 
moneykeepers. 
Fifty-six tontine groups were interviewed ranging from 4 to 
40 members in size. Fifty-six moneykeepers were interviewed from 
22 villages to determine the range of services offered, the 
number of village depositors serviced, the amount of deposit 
activity and informal loan activity engaged in by the money-
keepers. The results in both cases were revealing. The total 
amount of savings and loan activity generated by the 56 tontines 
over their complete life cycle of liquidity circulation (roughly 
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5 to 6 months) amounted to roughly 27 million CFAF (or US$ 72,000 
at the current exchange rate). The total amount of deposits 
mobilized by the 56 village moneykeepers fluctuated from a low of 
13 million CFAF (or US$ 34,000) during the dry season (for 363 
depositors) to 30 million CFAF (or US$ 79,000) at harvest time 
for 617 depositors. The average deposit size at the height of 
the season for the sample of moneykeepers (48,774 CFAF) was much 
larger than the average deposit balance in the Post Office 
Savings Bank and the average loan granted by moneykeepers (42,300 
CFAF) while smaller than the equipment loans of the CNCA was 
still sizeable. 
In short, these field results underscored the fact that 
there is a sizeable flow of liquidity circulation in these 
village settings. Given the generally good repayment record 
through these informal vehicles of financial intermediation, the 
question arises as to why this is so. The answer lies in the 
total range of financial services offered by these indigenous 
intermediaries and the incentives for repayment evident in 
borrower behavior. In summary, there is a large demand for 
deposit services at the village household level. Second, there 
is an equally large demand for short-term loans for consumption 
purposes in these settings. Third, these loan transactions are 
repeated continually. There is a constant series of transactions 
for the same borrower through time, constituting an open line of 
credit for emergency or other uses. Finally, there is an 
implicit link between savings activity and loan activity. For 
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tontines, this is direct, for moneykeepers indirect (i.e., 
depositors are likely favored with access to moneykeeper loans 
since their savings are proof of a reliable resource base for 
future repayment). In the end, the availability of funds for 
future loans encourages repayment. Also, the frequent and 
repeated deposit and loan transactions inculcate a sense of trust 
and responsibility between lender and borrower. 
These characteristics stand out in stark contrast to those 
of formal loans through the CNCA. Whereas deposit services are 
highlighted in informal finance, they are ignored in the CNCA. 
Whereas short-term loans are the preferred term structure in 
informal finance, medium and long-term loans are emphasized in 
formal finance through the CNCA. Whereas loans are untargeted in 
informal finance, targeting for investment or productive purposes 
is highlighted in the CNCA. Whereas a link exists between 
savings or deposit activity and loan activity in informal 
finance, this is absent in institutions like the CNCA. Whereas 
there is the possibility for an open line of credit (i.e., 
repeated short-term loans) or an emergency credit reserve 
available in informal finance, this form of finance is foreign to 
an institution like the CNCA. 
In brief, the range of financial services offered by a 
formal lending institution like the CNCA are markedly incomplete 
and restricted in scope in comparison to the services available 
through informal finance. Thus it is not surprising that village 
borrowers would be more concerned about honoring their informal 
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debt. The lack of frequent contact through repeated transactions 
of deposit or loan activity makes the CNCA seem alien or distant 
from the daily concerns of village clientele. It is difficult to 
develop a strong identity with or loyalty towards the interests 
of a credit program with these characteristics. 
III. Implications for Financial Deepening in Rural Niger 
It is ironical that public sector officials have such a 
patronizing and condescending view towards traditional forms of 
rural finance. Their concern is to ignore it or try to replace 
it quickly with formal institutions. Rarely do public officials 
learn from it. Yet, this is precisely the lesson to draw from 
the preceding discussion. If any institution hopes to remain 
viable and self-sustaining, it will have to offer the range of 
services for which villagers have demonstrated a strong demand, 
and, in servicing that demand, earn sufficient respect that loan 
recovery will become a natural habit of finance for borrowers. 
Formal institutions do not earn this respect in most African 
settings. In large part, this is due to the difficulties they 
encounter to service this demand. They are unable to evaluate a 
large volume of small loans, rarely offer deposit services, 
short-term loans or an emergency credit reserve. 
It is much more promising to build upon the strengths of the 
existing informal channels of finance. Instead of imposing a 
top-down lending arrangement from an institution located and 
controlled outside the village, it is more appropriate to upgrade 
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the existing informal networks from leadership within village 
settings. 
The most promising institutional form to emulate and build 
on the strengths of informal village finance is the savings and 
credit cooperative or rural credit union. This instituion 
emphasizes savings mobilization, thereby offering deposit 
services to its village clientele, provides short-term consump-
tion loans, and ties savings activity into an access to loans. 
Cooperative officials and credit committees are drawn from local 
village leadership thus ensuring its identity and interests with 
those of the village. The promotion and creation of local credit 
unions are carried out in a voluntary fashion among private 
individuals within the villages, thus avoiding any semblance of 
imposition from above. These operational and organizational 
features promote far more effective loan recovery behavior than 
what one could ever expect through a CNCA path of rural finance. 
Finally, it is germane to emphasize that these village-level 
credit unions are in a position to intermediate more efficiently 
village-level liquidity than the indigenous channels of informal 
finance. Tontine and moneykeeper lenders can only deal with a 
limited clientele. What they do, they do well, but their 
segmented and separate markets are local and small in size. 
Credit unions can broaden the base of membership to include 
several groups and occupations with the village. Moreover, in 
time, the multi-village (and town-level) credit union movement 
can form a network that would allow for inter-spatial financial 
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intermediation among deficit and surplus units in the network. 
This is something that informal channels are much less able to 
do. 
In conclusion, the top-down CNCA model emphasizing a 
truncated, incomplete form of supply-leading finance has little 
prospect of ever achieving viability through its sporadic and 
unsatisfactory contact with village clientele. Credit unions are 
far more promising vehicles to build viable, self-sustaining 
financial intermediaries at the village level in Africa. 
